How do electoral politics shape decisions?
Churchill was seen as a warmonger, and his re-election [to Parliament] was fought against the slogan “We cannot be the policeman of the world.” The dominating obsession was cost and troop numbers. The danger is that the U.S. is headed in the same direction.
Why were both countries so seemingly unprepared?
The Brits didn’t know Iraqi society because they wanted to keep costs down–they didn’t do a census. Since Iraq was rural, they thought it should be tribal, so they dealt with the sheiks that weren’t representatives at all. The U.S. has this simple view of Iraq as Sunni and Shia that would rip each other apart. That’s not true. Like Americans, Iraqis have ethnic and religious differences, but they’re Iraqis first.
Yet the Iraqi Governing Council is formed along sectarian lines.
It will lead to corruption and patronage. All that the people will see is a bunch of exiles eating big dinners in Baghdad and doing nothing for them. Britain installed King Faisal, and now the U.S. is pushing [Iraqi National Congress leader] Ahmad Chalabi. Once again Iraqis will see a ruler who is reviled as a conduit for American power.
Any other U.S. blind spots?
[Deputy Secretary of Defense] Paul Wolfowitz called Fallujah a hotbed of Baathist activity. To anyone who knows Iraq, Fallujah is a deeply conservative Sunni town, and the Baathists are secular. That’s a fundamental misunderstanding.
